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DTSTAMP:20240428T080554Z
SUMMARY:Dr. Maryam Saeedi\, Carnegie Mellon University 
DESCRIPTION: \n\nABSTRACT How does quality-certication aect product quality
  in\nmarkets? We exploit a policy change on eBay to analyze how a more\nst
 ringent certication policy aects entry and behavior across many\nmarkets s
 egments. We nd that rst\, entry increased in markets where\nit was harder 
 to get certied\, until a new steady state was reached.\nSecond\, the quali
 ty distribution of entrants exhibits fatter tails\nafter the policy\, and 
 overall quality is slightly higher. Last\, some\nincumbents respond by inc
 reasing the quality of their service to\nmaintain certication. The results
  inform the design of certication\npolicies in electronic and other market
 s. JEL D47\, D82\, L15\, L86\n 
DTSTART:20180223T190000Z
DTEND:20180223T203000Z
LOCATION:Gerri C. LeBow Hall\, 3220 Market Street\, 722\, Philadelphia\, PA
  19104
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