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UID:a58811a339b6b3fd893a5882bd1fdb12
DTSTAMP:20240429T105052Z
SUMMARY:Dr. Kyle Herkenhoff\, University of Minnesota 
DESCRIPTION: \n\nDr. Herkenhoff will present “CAN THE UNEMPLOYED BORROW? 
 IMPLICATIONS\nFOR PUBLIC INSURANCE”\n\nABSTRACT: We show that individual
 s maintain significant access to\ncredit following job loss. Unconstrained
  workers who lose their jobs\nborrow\, while constrained workers who lose 
 their jobs default and\ndelever. Both default and borrowing allow unemploy
 ed workers to smooth\nconsumption\, and they pay an interest rate premium 
 to do so\, i.e. the\ncredit market acts as a limited private unemployment 
 insurance market.\nWe show theoretically that a credit-registry and long-t
 erm credit\nrelationships allow credit markets to serve as a market for pr
 ivate\nunemployment insurance\, despite adverse selection. We then ask\, g
 iven\ncurrent U.S. credit access\, what is the optimal provision of public
 \nunemployment insurance? We find that the optimal provision of public\nin
 surance is unambiguously lower as credit access expands. The median\nindiv
 idual in our simulated economy would prefer to have the income\nreplacemen
 t rate from public unemployment insurance lowered from the\ncurrent US pol
 icy of 42% to 38%. However\, a utilitarian planner would\nactually prefer 
 to raise public unemployment insurance relative to\ncurrent US levels\, ev
 en in the presence of well-developed credit\nmarkets\n 
DTSTART:20181109T190000Z
DTEND:20181109T203000Z
LOCATION:Gerri C. LeBow Hall\, 3220 Market Street\, 109\, Philadelphia\, PA
  19104
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