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UID:591aa13f5e3c03bd268403ff41ad11d6
DTSTAMP:20240430T080036Z
SUMMARY:Yuyun Zhong\, PhD Candidate at Drexel University
DESCRIPTION: \n\nTitle: Information Provision under Showrooming and Webroom
 ing\n\nAbstract: Deviations between consumers’ information gathering and
 \npurchase channels may lead to showrooming and webrooming\, where the\nfo
 rmer refers to obtaining product information in a brick-and-mortar\nstore 
 but purchasing online while the latter corresponds to the\nreverse. In thi
 s paper\, we endogenize consumers’ information\ngathering and purchase d
 ecisions and characterize the optimal\ninformation provision decision for 
 an online retailer in the presence\nof a rival brick-and-mortar (BM) store
 . For instances where\nshowrooming can arise\, we find that the optimal in
 formation level\ndecreases with showrooming probability and that the showr
 ooming\nbehavior may not necessarily be detrimental to the profit of the B
 M\nstore or improve the profit of the online retailer. In instances with\n
 webrooming\, we again find that the optimal information level decreases\nw
 ith webrooming probability but that the profit of the online retailer\nalw
 ays decreases with the probability that consumers consider\nwebrooming. Fu
 rther\, we also present a comprehensive overview of how\nvarious combinati
 ons of store and online prices affect the optimal\ninformation level. Last
 ly\, we consider an extension for price matching\nstrategies.\n 
DTSTART:20191108T183000Z
DTEND:20191108T200000Z
LOCATION:Gerri C. LeBow Hall\, 3220 Market Street\, 209\, Philadelphia\, PA
  19104
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