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UID:d25db94bed152948457e28e7cb51e16c
DTSTAMP:20240427T162822Z
SUMMARY:"Board Structure and Monitoring: New Evidence from CEO Turnovers" A
 uthors: Lixiong Guo and Ronald Masulis - School of Banking and Finance The
  University of New South Wales
DESCRIPTION: \n\nAbstract “We use the 2003 NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules 
 concerning\nboard and committee independence as a quasi-natural experiment
  to\nexamine the causal relations between board structure and CEO\nmonitor
 ing. Noncompliant firms forced to raise board independence or\nadopt a ful
 ly independent nominating committee significantly increase\ntheir forced C
 EO turnover sensitivity to performance relative to\ncompliant firms. Nomin
 ating committee independence is important even\nfor firms with an independ
 ent board\, and the effect is stronger when\nthe CEO previously sat on the
  committee. We conclude that more\nindependent boards and fully independen
 t nominating committees lead to\nmore effective CEO monitoring and discipl
 ine”.\n 
DTSTART:20150109T060000Z
DTEND:20150109T080000Z
LOCATION:Gerri C. LeBow Hall\, 3220 Market Street\, 405\, Philadelphia\, PA
  19104
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