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SUMMARY:Dr. Dan Cao\, Georgetown University 
DESCRIPTION: \n\nDr. Cao research intrest are Macroeconomics\, Economic The
 ory\, Finance\,\nComputational Economics\n\nDynamics Savings Choices with 
 Disagreements\n\nWe study a flexible dynamic savings game in continuous ti
 me\, where\ndecision makers rotate in and out of power. These agents value
 \nspending more highly while in power creating a time-inconsistency\nprobl
 em. We provide a sharp characterization of Markov equilibria. Our\nanalysi
 s proceeds by construction and isolates the importance of a\nlocal disagre
 ement index\, b(c)\, defined as the ratio of marginal\nutility for those i
 n and out of power. If disagreement is constant the\nmodel specializes to 
 hyperbolic discounting. We also provide novel\nresults for this case\, off
 ering a complete and simple characterization\nof equilibria. For the gener
 al model we show that dissaving occurs\nwhen disagreements are sufficientl
 y high\, while saving occurs when\ndisagreements are sufficiently low. Whe
 n disagreements vary\nsufficiently with spending\, richer dynamics are pos
 sible. We provide\nconditions for continuous equilibria and also show that
  the model can\nbe inverted for primitives that support any smooth consump
 tion\nfunction. Our framework applies to individuals under a behavioral\ni
 nterpretation or to governments under a political-economy\ninterpretation.
 \n 
DTSTART:20161021T180000Z
DTEND:20161021T193000Z
LOCATION:https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/125966/PorkDebt.pdf
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