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UID:2dcc9828dea489f242d58a7725de0dcd
DTSTAMP:20240429T160049Z
SUMMARY:Faculty Seminar: Dr. Ginger Jin\, Prof.  University of Maryland and
  Director of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Economics
DESCRIPTION: \n\nIs No News (Perceived as) Bad News? An Experimental Invest
 igation of\nInformation Disclosure Ginger Zhe Jin\, Michael Luca\, Daniel 
 Martin\n\nThis paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a centra
 l\nprediction of disclosure theory: that market forces can lead\nbusinesse
 s to voluntarily provide information about the quality of\ntheir products.
  This theoretical prediction is based on unraveling\narguments\, which req
 uire that consumers hold correct beliefs about\nnon-disclosed information.
  Instead\, we find that receivers are\ninsufficiently skeptical about non-
 disclosed information\, and as a\nconsequence\, senders do not always disc
 lose their private information.\nHowever\, when subjects are informed abou
 t non-disclosed information\nafter each round\, behavior slowly converges 
 to full unraveling. This\nconvergence appears to be driven by an asymmetri
 c response in receiver\nactions after learning that they were profitably d
 eceived. Despite the\nchange in receiver behavior\, stated beliefs about s
 ender strategies\nremain insufficiently skeptical\, which suggests that wh
 ile direct and\nimmediate feedback induces equilibrium behavior\, it does 
 not reduce\nstrategic naïveté.\n 
DTSTART:20161014T180000Z
DTEND:20161014T193000Z
LOCATION:Gerri C. LeBow Hall\, 3220 Market Street\, 722\, Philadelphia\, PA
  19104
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