Essays on Mutual Fund Governance

In this proposal, I focus on mechanisms mutual funds use to share and receive information. First, I examine how mutual funds convey fund performance information with current and prospective shareholders, and the conflicts that arise between maximizing fund family value and maximizing fund shareholder value. To examine this, I evaluate the benchmarks that mutual fund managers are evaluated against for compensation purposes, versus the benchmarks that are advertised to investors in the prospectus. To determine why these benchmarks are different, I examine three hypotheses: reporting requirements, information and agency. Second, in co-authored work with Naveen Daniel and Daniel Dorn, we examine the information flow between fund families and portfolio firms. We develop and empirically test the quid-pro-quo hypotheses that firms exchange information with investors in exchange for their votes.

Many thanks to Madeline’s dissertation committee: • Committee Chair – Naveen Daniel – Associate Professor – Drexel University • Committee Co-Chair: Daniel Dorn - Associate Professor – Drexel University • Committee Member: Michelle Lowry – Professor – Drexel University • Committee Member: Caitlin Dillon Dannhauser - Assistant Professor – Villanova University • Committee Member: Casey Dougal - Assistant Professor – Florida State University