Katharina Lewellen, shows that nonprofit hospitals lack features that are traditionally associated with good governance, such as nimble boards and more.
Joseph Kalmenovitz, PhD, shows that regulators protect their outside option for higher-paid jobs in the private sector by avoiding post-employment restrictions.
Paolo Volpin shows that mandatory disclosure of financial information facilitates new deal opportunities, leading to M&A activity and better acquisitions.
When regulatory oversight is fragmented across multiple government agencies, firms incur higher costs and have lower productivity, profitability and growth.
A study by Greg Nini shows that creditors play an active governance role by blocking the restructuring tactics of distressed firms if they are value-destroying.
A study by Naveen Daniel shows that mandating the appointment of a risk committee and a chief risk officer in banking institutions has no impact on bank risk.
Shareholders in areas hit by a hurricane change their perception of climate-related risks and become more likely to vote in favor of an environmental proposal.
Greg Nini shows that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, firms with the largest shocks to their expected future cash flows raised larger amounts of capital.
Michelle Lowry, PhD, dispels the claim that ownership of rival firms by one institutional investor encourages firm coordination and decreases competition.
Held in person for the first time since 2019, the 17th Directors Academy featured the most qualified and diverse group of attendees in the program’s history.
To what extent do fund managers possess the ability to generate excess returns from investing in firms before they become targets for a merger or acquisition?
