Decision Sciences and MIS

Past Seminars

This talk focuses on current efforts of my research group in the direction of establishing data-driven intelligent systems.

Dr. Nir Kshetri will discuss his paper titled “The Impacts of Blockchain on the Production and Distribution of Food and Beverage Products”.

Tom Meyvis is a Professor of Marketing and Peter Drucker Faculty Fellow at the Stern School of Business, New York University.

Dr. Lauren Block’s work is primarily in areas of food well-being, health-persuasion, and perceptions of product efficacy.

Sila Ada is a doctoral candidate and research associate at the Institute for Interactive Marketing & Social Media, Vienna University of Economics and Business.

We describe the changes that managers will have to make to cope with this emerging Feeling Economy.

Nobody pays retail anymore: Optimal pricing in distribution channels with bargain-hunting consumers’

Professor Bonezzi’s research investigates fundamental behavioral phenomena that can inform marketing practice.

Professor Wang research focuses on luxury brands and conspicuous consumption, and social/ interpersonal influence on consumer’s behavior.

Dr. Morrin’s current research focuses on examining how the human senses impact the consumer decision-making process.

Wendy Moe is Professor of Marketing and Director of the Masters of Science in Marketing Analytics at the University of Maryland’s School of Business.

This talk illustrates capabilities in Mathematica 11 and other Wolfram technologies that are directly applicable for use in teaching and research on campus.

Murat Kurt
Senior Scientist of Outcomes Research, Predictive and Economic Modeling
Merck & Co, Inc.

Yunan Liu, NC State University

Abstract: Queueing theory is a field driven by applications. But unfortunately, there still remains a large gap between tractable theoretical studies and practical applications, such as call centers and health care systems, which have many realistic features (e.g., time-varying arrivals, customer abandonment, non-exponential distributions, and complicated network structures). In response to the challenge, we study a general G_t/GI/s_t+GI queueing model, which has a non-stationary non-Poisson arrival process (the G_t), non-exponential service times (the first GI), and allows customer abandonment according to a non-exponential patience distribution (the +GI). To bridge the gap between mathematical tractability and model applicability, we develop fundamental principles and optimal control policies for such a general queueing model.
Analytic formulas are developed to set the time-dependent number of servers in order to stabilize important service-level indicators, including: mean customer delay, probability of abandonment, and tail probability of delay (TPoD). Taking the TPoD for example: for any delay target w > 0 and probability target 0 < alpha < 1, we determine appropriate time-dependent staffing levels (the s_t) so that the time-varying probability that the waiting time exceeds a maximum acceptable value w is stabilized at alpha at all times. In addition, effective approximating formulas are provided for other important performance functions such as the probabilities of delay and abandonment, and the means of delay and queue length. Many-server heavy-traffic limit theorems in the efficiency-driven regime are developed to show that (i) the proposed staffing function achieves the goal asymptotically as the scale increases, and (ii) the proposed approximating formulas for other performance measures are asymptotically accurate as the scale increases. Extensive simulations show that both the staffing functions and the performance approximations are effective, even for smaller systems having an average of 3 servers.

U.S. hospitals join GPOs for procurement cost savings. It is generally believed that GPOs lower costs through demand aggregation. Until recently hospitals purchasing supplies from a GPO vendor had to pay a GPO-negotiated price. The novel practice of custom contracting allows GPO member hospital to negotiate with GPO vendors to improve on the GPO negotiated prices. Hospital procurement departments have welcomed this practice, lauding the opportunity to further lower hospital costs. In this paper, we use economic modeling to investigate the practice of custom contracting. We develop a game-theoretic model treating as endogenous the pricing and negotiations decisions of the GPO vendor and of member hospitals. We show why – counter to the hospital industry’s expectations – expected purchase prices will not decrease with the introduction of custom contracting. The practice benefits GPO vendors at the expense of the member hospitals.